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Abstract:
The rise and spread of antibiotic resistance causes worsening medical cost and mor-
tality especially for life-threatening bacteria infections, thereby posing a major threat
to global health. Prescribing behavior of physicians is one of the important fac-
tors impacting the underlying dynamics of resistance evolution. It remains unclear
when individual prescribing decisions can lead to the overuse of antibiotics on the
population level, and whether population optimum of antibiotic use can be reached
through an adaptive social learning process that governs the evolution of prescribing
norm. Here we study a behavior-disease interaction model, specifically incorporating
a feedback loop between prescription behavior and resistance evolution. We identify
the conditions under which antibiotic resistance can evolve as a result of the tragedy
of the commons in antibiotic overuse. Furthermore, we show that fast social learn-
ing that adjusts prescribing behavior in prompt response to resistance evolution can
steer out cyclic oscillations of antibiotic usage quickly towards the stable population
optimum of prescribing. Our work demonstrates that provision of prompt feedback
to prescribing behavior with the collective consequences of treatment decisions and
costs that are associated with resistance helps curb the overuse of antibiotics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Antibiotics have been used primarily as human medicine for the treatment and prevention of
bacterial infections for about 80 years; later as a growth promoter applied in animal feeds, for
about 65 years [1, 2]. In this period, it has proved itself incredibly powerful to benefit individual
patients, to suppress the overall epidemic of diseases and also to expand livestock production [3–
5]. However, the wide use of antibiotics in our society is tagged along by the development of
resistance, first identified in the 1940’s [3, 6–19].
In recent years, the number of new antibiotics approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) has been dramatically reduced, suggesting an ‘EROOM’ law (a phenomenon in con-
trast to the Moore’s law) [11, 20, 21]. Even worse, the time period of an antibiotic’s effectiveness
from its introduction to first resistance identified becomes increasingly short (Fig. 1A). Moreover,
superbugs (multi-drug resistant bacteria) such as Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) seem to
outsmart our efforts to treat infectious diseases [6–8, 12, 13, 16, 22–25]. Antibiotic resistance is
associated with worsening mortality and medical costs [26]. As a consequence, we are confronted
with antibiotic resistance crisis, at the risk of running out of effective antibiotics for infection
treatments [19].
One of the important factors contributing to the the fast emergence of resistance is overpre-
scribing [27–30]. High demand for antibiotics driven by individual self-interest is not necessarily
aligned with the social optimum of antibiotic consumption. Under certain conditions, the overuse
of antibiotics can lead to the tragedy of the commons [24, 31–34]. Therefore, it is of significant
public health interest to understand and manage antibiotic resistance from this behavioral perspec-
tive.
Here, we focus on the interaction of prescription behavior and resistance evolution through a
feedback loop (Fig. 1B): collective outcomes of prescribing decisions affect the underlying resis-
tance evolution, which in turn influences prescription behavior. The behavior-disease interaction
model of this kind is simple yet proof of concept, and sheds light on how social learning of pre-
scription behavior in response to the underlying evolutionary dynamics of resistance can render
population optimum of antibiotic use.
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II. RESULTS & DISCUSSION
To begin with, we use an evolutionary epidemiological model to describe the competition dy-
namics of sensitive versus resistant strains (see Methods & Model). We focus on quantifying the
extent to which the (over)use of antibiotics would cause the emergence of resistance in the long
run. To do so, we introduce the parameter θ to denote the presentation rate of infected individuals
who bring their condition to a physician’s attention and seek antibiotic treatment for their illness
(In this regard, the θ value is determined by individual disease awareness and health-seeking be-
havior). To account for prescribing norm of physicians, we use p to denote the likelihood that each
patient at presentation is prescribed antibiotic treatment, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Thus, the overall prescribing
rate, pθ, mediates the selection pressure on resistance that is attributed to collective consequence
of prescription behavior.
We use the next-generation approach to calculate basic reproductive ratios for both strains, Rs
and Rm in closed-form (see SI for details). We assume that resistance is costly in the absence of
treatment, but confers an advantage in the presence of treatment; that is, resistance compromises
the efficacy of treatment, 0 ≤ m < 1. Comparing Rs and Rm allows us to answer questions of
interest, such as predicting whether resistance can evolve in the long run.
For simplicity, we first consider resistance evolution under full treatment (p = 1), in which
infected individuals, once seen by medical professionals at their presentation, unvaryingly receive
antibiotic treatment. As shown in Fig. 2A, we characterize the conditions for resistance evolution
in the parameter space (θ, m). For small θ values below a threshold (blue region in Fig. 2A),
neither can the disease be eradicated, nor can resistance evolve. Disease can be eradicated for high
θ and m (yellow region in Fig. 2A). However, for combinations of intermediate θ and low m (red
region in Fig. 2A), resistance evolves and leads to disease escape despite full treatment.
To further gain intuitive understanding of how resistance evolution depends on antibiotic use,
we plot the disease prevalence with respect to treatment probability p, corresponding to the three
scenarios as colored in Fig. 2A. The sensitive strain is predominant for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, whereas the
resistant strain is maintained at low frequency purely by the mutation-selection equilibrium (Fig.
2B). Disease can be eradicated for sufficiently high treatment rate and resistance has no chance to
evolve (Fig. 2C). In Fig. 2D, disease eradication is impossible due to the emergence of resistance
that greatly comprises the efficacy of treatment; resistance can be selected for p above a critical
threshold p > ph (see SI), and as a consequence, the predominant incidence of infections switches
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from sensitive to resistant strains.
Let us now turn our attention to this last scenario where resistance evolution is inevitable for
p > ph. Empirical evidence shows that there exists a threshold in prescription rate above which
sustained resistance can cause huge public health crisis [35]. To determine the population optimum
of antibiotic use, we need to take into account the impact of resistance on the cost-benefit analysis
of antibiotic treatment (Fig. 3). The cost of sensitive infection, if treated, can be mitigated. In
contrast, resistant infections may greatly exacerbate the overall cost for both treated and untreated
cases [36]. Under these conditions, the overall social burden of the disease can be minimized at p =
ph (i.e., population optimum). Although the disease prevalence and thus the risk of infection for
susceptible individuals can be lowered by overprescribing beyond ph (Fig. 3A), the cost associated
with resistance is much greater than the benefit, if any, that full treatment could provide (Fig. 3B).
Despite these population-level considerations, individual self-interest can cause antibiotic
overuse, thereby leading to a tragedy of the commons. This is largely due to the disconnect be-
tween individual behavior and population-level resistance in prescribing decision-makings. There-
fore, curbing antibiotic overuse requires provision of feedback to individual prescribing behavior
with the social costs and consequences of their collective action. In light of this, we investi-
gate whether population optimum of antibiotic use can be reached if the society learns from the
collective consequences of treatment decisions and costs that are associated with resistance and
accordingly adjusts prescription behavior.
We assume disease dynamics coevolves with a social norm that governs prescription behavior
(see Methods & Model). We use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of prescription
norm [37, 38]. Prescription norm changes in response to the actual payoffs of individual prescrib-
ing versus non-prescribing behavior, which are determined by disease prevalence and resistance
evolution on the population level. This feedback loop between prescription behavior and resistance
evolution constitutes an adaptive social learning process in which the society adjusts antibiotic use
in response to the underlying resistance evolution.
We find that how swiftly the society responds to the underlying resistance evolution has an
impact on the coevolutionary dynamics (Fig. 4). Slow social learning leads to prolonged oscil-
latory dynamics of overprescribing and underprescribing, and thus gives chance for resistance to
accumulate and build up in the population, causing resurgences of marked resistance prevalence
alternated with sensitive infections (Fig. 4A). In stark contrast, fast social learning can help the
population steer out cyclic oscillations of antibiotic use due to overcorrection. In this latter case,
5
the society adapts prescription norm so quickly that resistance has no chance to grow into pro-
nounced prevalence as it is outpaced by the change in prescribing behavior. Besides, fast social
learning helps the society settle on a social norm that reaches the population optimum of antibiotic
use (Fig. 4B).
We demonstrate that social learning without centralized institutions can maneuver the pop-
ulation towards a socially optimal policy of prescribing, therefore helping curb the overuse of
antibiotics. Our theoretical results are in line with recent trial findings that highlight the impor-
tance of provision of social norm feedback in reducing antibiotic overuse [29]. Taken together, in
order to reach sustainable use of antibiotics, it is important to promote awareness of the population
problem of resistance by providing prompt feedback to prescribing behavior with the social cost
of resistance.
Owing to the drastic slowdown of new drug discoveries [21, 39], managing resistance evo-
lution with an emphasis on human factors, as we demonstrate here, seems to be necessary and
feasible [40]. Prior studies suggest that the consumption of antibiotics and the patterns in which
different agents are deployed directly impact the frequency of resistance and the number of inef-
fective antibiotics [35, 41, 42]. To inform rational use of antibiotics, efforts should be focused on
developing new diagnostic technologies and strategies for reducing the inappropriate use of antibi-
otics [43], determining the optimal timing of deployment sequence for existing drugs [44, 45], and
optimizing combination therapies [46, 47]. Moreover, promoting and enforcing infection control
procedures in hospitals can prevent the spread of resistance and mitigate the impact of resistance
on society [9, 15, 16, 27, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49]. Along these lines, it is worthwhile for future study to
incorporate population structure [50] and multiple drugs [51–53] in the coevolutionary dynamics
of prescribing behavior and multi-drug resistance.
The socially optimum use of antibiotics implies a second order of dilemma – not every sickness
should be treated, but who on earth deserves the treatment and who would have to forgo? This
consideration leads to the ethics dilemma of accessibility of antibiotics, an important topic worthy
of further investigation. Reducing antibiotics usage via national guidelines has been found to
lead to significant decreases in resistance [41, 42], yet denials or approvals of antibiotic treatment
seem to be determined by an arbitrary trade-off between preventing resistance and treating infected
patients [20]. With multiple interest groups such as pharmaceutical industry, public institutions as
well as patients themselves involved in the problem, it is of fundamental interest to look into the
issues of supervising the common pool resources and enhancing collaborative efforts through the
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behavioral perspective [18, 24].
III. METHODS & MODEL
The coevolutionary dynamics of prescription behavior and resistance is described by the fol-
lowing system of ordinary differential equations:
dS
dt = b − βsS [I0s + (1 − s)Its] − βmS [I0m + (1 − m)Itm] − dS ,
dI0s
dt = βs(1 − µs)S [I0s + (1 − s)Its] + βmµmS [I0m + (1 − m)Itm] − pθI0s − γ0s I0s − dI0s ,
dIts
dt = pθI
0
s − γtsIts − dIts,
dI0m
dt = βsµsS [I
0
s + (1 − s)Itm] + βm(1 − µm)S [I0m + (1 − m)Itm] − pθI0m − γ0mI0m − dI0m,
dItm
dt = pθI
0
m − γtmItm − dItm,
dRs
dt = γ
0
s I
0
s + γ
t
sI
t
s − dRs,
dRm
dt = γ
0
mI
0
m + γ
t
mI
t
m − dRm,
dp
dt = ωp(1 − p)( fA − fB).
(1)
Here, S , I and R are the fractions of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals in the popu-
lation with I0s , I
t
s, I
0
m and I
t
m denoting the four infection cases (infected with sensitive or resistant
strains, and untreated or treated); Rs and Rm the two recovery cases, respectively. The two param-
eters µs and µm indicate the mutation rates between the two strains. The parameter b denotes the
birth rate per capita (which is set to be equal to the death rate d); βs and βm are the transmission
rates of the two strains; γ0s , γ
t
s, γ
0
m and γ
t
m are the respective recovery rates of different infection
cases (infected with sensitive or resistant strain; untreated or treated); s and m are the efficacies
of the antibiotic for the two strains.
We use the replicator equation to describe the evolution of prescribing behavior as given in
the last equation [37]. We begin our analysis with characterizing the conditions for resistance
evolution for given levels of antibiotic use p in the long run.
A. Basic reproductive ratios
The basic reproductive ratios Rs and Rm of the two strains can be determined by the spectral
radius of the next-generation operator FV−1, where F is the reproduction matrix and V the state
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transition matrix [54–56]. We obtain that
Rs = βs(γ
t
s + b) + βs(1 − s)pθ
(γts + b)(pθ + γ0s + b)
, (2)
Rm = βm(γ
t
m + b) + βm(1 − m)pθ
(γtm + b)(pθ + γ0m + b)
. (3)
We assume that resistance incurs a fitness penalty, so that the transmission rates βs > βm.
Despite the fact that laboratory studies revealed a scenario where compensatory evolution (resis-
tant bacteria ameliorating the costs by acquiring fitness-compensatory mutations) and cost-free
resistances can slow down the primary driver for reversibility and that co-selection between the re-
sistance mechanism and other selected markers can delay any latent reversibility driven by fitness
costs in vitro [57], clinical studies have found that the compensatory adaptation is not effective in
vivo, which is in line with our assumption [58]. Theoretical arguments and experimental results,
in addition, provide basis for that the fitness costs of resistance is critical to the displacement of
resistant strains with sensitive ones [57, 58].
Both Rs(p) and Rm(p) are decreasing functions of p under our model assumptions (see SI). We
demonstrate that the graphs of the two basic reproductive numbers will vary with values of their
endpoints Rs(1) and Rm(1) (see the SI for details). Without loss of generality, we scrutinize the
following three cases: (I) Rs > 1; (II-a) Rs(1) < 1 and Rm(1) < 1; (II-b) Rs(1) < 1 < Rm(1). The
case noteworthy in practice is the last one, in which resistant strains predominate and even full
treatment can not eradicate the disease.
For a better understanding of the disease dynamics in case II-b, we perform a further investi-
gation of the relations among those parameters, where the presentation rates θs and θm for the two
infected cases are seen as independent. Substituting p = 1 into (2) and (3) and combining with the
inequality Rs(1) < 1 < Rm(1), we derive an equivalent condition for case II-b to occur:
0 ≤ s ≤ 1, if θs > θ∗s ,
∗s < s ≤ 1, if θs < θ∗s .
and

0 ≤ m ≤ 1, if θm < θ∗r ,
0 ≤ m < ∗r , if θm > θ∗r .
(4)
The values of θ∗s , 
∗
s , θ
∗
r and 
∗
r are given in the SI. Therefore, to get the basic reproductive ratio
below 1 and thus control the disease, we need θm to be greater than θ∗m or m greater than 
∗
m. The
two solvents correspond to either patients presenting promptly after infection or introducing potent
antibiotics in treatment.
Moreover, let ph be the critical prescribing probability (which can be translated into treatment
coverage, namely, the proportion of patients that are prescribed antibiotic treatment) at which the
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dominance of the two strains switches in case II-b. For γ0s = γ
0
m, we derive a simplified form
ph =
βs − βm
θ[βm(1−m)
γtm+b
− βs(1−s)
γts+b
]
, (5)
where ph is referred to as the social optimum of antibiotic use (see details in the SI).
B. Cost-benefit analysis
When p < ph, the sensitive strain dominates and the system converges to an equilibrium, of
which we derive a closed form approximation (Sˆ , Iˆ0s, Iˆt s, Rˆs); when p > ph, the resistant strain
dominates, with the system converging to another equilibrium, approximated by (Sˆ , Iˆ0m, Iˆtm, Rˆm).
We prove in the SI that S is increasing while I0 and I0 + It are decreasing with respect to p for
both equilibria.
For susceptible individuals, if the sensitive strain dominates, the infection probability at equi-
librium is approximately
ϕs =
βs[Iˆ0s + (1 − s)Iˆts]
βs[Iˆ0s + (1 − s)Iˆts] + b
, (6)
which can be simplified as 1− Sˆ = 1− 1Rs . Analogously, if the resistant strain prevails, the infection
probability at equilibrium is approximately
ϕm =
βm[Iˆ0m + (1 − m)Iˆtm]
βm[Iˆ0m + (1 − m)Iˆtm] + b
= 1 − 1Rm . (7)
Although the actual treatment cost can be determined only after treatment outcomes, it is expected
that (1) sensitive strain claims lower sickness and treatment costs while it redounds to greater
treatment benefit (CIs < CIm , BTs > BTm and CTs < CTm), (2) treatment of patients with sensitive
strains can mitigate the overall cost of infection (CTs −CIs < BTs), and in contrast (3) treatment of
patients with resistant strains may exacerbate the overall cost of infection (CTm −CIm > BTm) [36].
When it comes to the population, the total social cost is a piecewise function
Csocial =

(CTs − BTs)(Iˆ0s + Iˆts) + (CIs + BTs −CTs)Iˆ0s , when p < ph
(CTm − BTm)(Iˆ0m + Iˆtm) − (CTm −CIm − BTm)Iˆtm. when p > ph.
(8)
Invoking the monotonicity of Iˆ0s and Iˆ
0
s + Iˆ
t
s, it is easy to verify that the total social cost Csocial is
decreasing when p < ph. However, Csocial may not be monotonic when p > ph.
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C. Social learning
We consider that prescription behavior coevolves with disease dynamics. We regard the prob-
lem as a two strategy game, prescribing (denoted as A) vs nonprescribing (B). The evolution of
prescribing behavior can be described by:
p˙ = ωp(1 − p)( fA − fB), (9)
where p is the frequency of prescribing A and p˙ is referred to as the rate of prescription norm
evolution, driven by the time scale parameter of social learning, ω.
The expected payoffs fA and fB are
fA = λs(BTs −CTs) + λm(BTm −CTm), (10)
fB = λs(−CIs) + λm(−CIm), (11)
with
λs =
βs[I0s + (1 − s)Its]
βs[I0s + (1 − s)Its] + βm[I0m + (1 − m)Itm]
, (12)
λm =
βm[I0m + (1 − m)Itm]
βs[I0s + (1 − s)Its] + βm[I0m + (1 − m)Itm]
. (13)
Here λs and λm are the conditional probabilities of individuals being infected with sensitive or
resistant strains, respectively.
Denote the fractions of individuals infected with sensitive and resistant strains by Is and Im,
respectively (Is = I0s + I
t
s and Im = I
0
m + I
t
m). The behavior of the disease dynamics are described
by Is and Im while the prescribing norm is presented by p, all as functions of the time t.
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FIG. 1: Problem of antibiotic resistance. (A) Timeline plot of resistance emergence for common antibiotics.
The time period of an antibiotic’s effectiveness from its introduction to first resistance identified becomes
increasingly short. (B) Prescribing behavior is one of the driving factors contributing to the fast emergence
of resistance. The interaction between resistance evolution and prescripting behavior plays an important
role in determining the timeline of resistance emergence.
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FIG. 2: Resistance evolution and antibiotic usage. (A) Shown is the parameter region of presentation rate
θ and efficacy against resistance m under which antibiotic resistance can emerge. (B), (C), (D) plot the
prevalence of sensitive and resistant strains as a function of treatment probability p. Resistance can be
favored under sufficiently high treatment coverage and as a consequence, the tragedy of the commons in
antibiotic overuse can occur. Parameters: b = 0.1, βs = 0.3, βm = 0.26, γ0s = γ
0
m = 0.1, γ
t
s = 0.3, γ
t
m = 0.2,
s = 1, (A) m = 0, (B) m = 0.6, θ = 0.05, (C) m = 0.8, θ = 0.6, (D) m = 0, θ = 0.2, (B)-(D)
µs = µm = 10−6.
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FIG. 3: Cost-benefit analysis of antibiotic usage. (A) From the perspective of susceptible individuals, their
infection risk reduces with increasing treatment probability (coverage) p, but there exists a threshold of
treatment coverage, ph, above which the risk of infection almost exclusively comes from resistant strain
instead of sensitive stain. (B) Accounting for the differing costs of treating patients infected with sensitive
and resistant strains, the threshold ph corresponds to the social optimum of antibiotic usage: the total societal
disease burden is decreasing with p for p < ph, but followed by a surge in the total cost of infection due to
resistance. Parameters: (A),(B) b = 0.1, βs = 0.3, βm = 0.26, γ0s = γ
0
m = 0.1, γ
t
s = 0.3, γ
t
m = 0.2, s = 1,
m = 0, θ = 0.2, µs = µm = 10−6, (B) relative social burden of the disease: CIs = 1, CTs = 0.2, BTs = 0.3,
CIm = 2, BTm = 0.1.
17
AB
FIG. 4: Social learning impacts antibiotic usage. The antibiotic usage behavior can be adjusted in response
to the underlying dynamics of resistance evolution. The convergence of optimum antibiotic usage is de-
termined by how promptly the society learns from the collective consequences of treatment decisions and
costs that are associated with resistance. (A) Slow learning leads to oscillatory dynamics of antibiotic usage
(between overuse and lesser use) together with alternating dominance of resistant and sensitive strains. (B)
Fast learning can steer out cyclic oscillations of antibiotic usage due to overcorrection, and therefore helps
the society quickly reach socially optimal usage. Parameters: b = 0.1, βs = 0.3, βm = 0.26, γ0s = γ
0
m = 0.1,
γts = 0.3, γ
t
m = 0.2, s = 1, m = 0, θ = 0.2, µs = µm = 10
−6, relative social burden of the disease: CIs = 1,
CTs = 0.2, BTs = 0.3, CIm = 2, CTm = 20, BTm = 0.1, (A) ω = 0.001, (B) ω = 0.1.
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